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TORTS -

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

LIABILrIY OF MANUFACTURER OF POISON TO REMOTE USERS

- Defendant manufacturer sold poisonous hair dye to a beautician, instructing
her to warn patrons to keep their eyes closed when the dye was being applied.
The beautician failed to so inform the plaintiff, a patron, and the plaintiff
suffered injuries for which she now sues. Held, the manufacturer's warning to
the immediate vendee did not relieve him of liability to vendee's patron. Petzold
'II, RoW( Laboratories, 256 App. Div. 1096, II N. Y. S. (2d) 565 (1939).1
Although the New York court, in dealing with litigation between manufacturers and remote vendees, has found a duty existing in many situations
where other courts would be unwilling so to find, the court has not heretofore
imposed absolute liability.2 Instead, manufacturers of inherently dangerous
products have been held accountable for only those injuries resulting from negli-

1 ''Defendan~ instrnction to a so-r:alled 'beautician' to instruct patrons to keep
their eyes closed, and notice to such beautician that the product contained a metallic
salt, were immaterial." 256 App. Div. at 1097.
2 This trend in -the New York Ia,v is discussed in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
217 N. Y. 382, III N. E. 1050 (1916), in which the court points out how the
group of exceptions to Winterbottom v. Wright, IO M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep.
402 (1842), has gradually been widened. In the latter case of Smith v. P.eerless Glass
Co., 259 N. Y. 292, 181 N. E. 576 (1932), the court abandons the "rule and
e.,:ceptions" approach to the matter, and treats the problem simply as a question of
normal tort duty.
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gence.3 Earlier cases, in situations similar to the principal case, relieved defendant if he properly labeled his product; 4 however, in the principal case a label
would not have warned the plaintiff, and since it is impossible to warn people
in the plaintiff's position personally, if the defendant is to be relieved it must
be because his instruction to the immediate vendee was adequate. It is possible
that this case represents a further extension of the court's tendency to protect
the public from dangerous articles by requiring the manufacturer of poison to
place it on the market at his peril, where he is unable to wam the remote
users. On the facts of this case the results would not be unduly harsh, since the
protection of the sight of an eye is so important that it should be accomplished
even if this necessitates the foregoing of the use of all hair dyes. However,
if this case imposes an absolute liability upon the manufacturer of poisons, the
doctrine would unwisely extend not only to manufacturers of similar unimportant articles, but also to products indispensable to modern living. (For
example, poisonous medicines are highly beneficial if used properly, but lethal
if used improperly.') The authorities speak of a duty to use due care to warn,
but they do not speak of this duty as being absolute.I' Therefore, it is submitted
that the court followed such authority and found the defendant liable, not
because he failed to reach the ultimate consumer, but because his warning to
the immediate vendee was inadequate. The language of the court seems to
indicate that this was the basis of the decision, for the court says: "Defendants'
instructions to a so-called 'beautician' • • • were immaterial. Such instructions
and notice did not apprise any one that the dye was dangerous and poisonous. • ••" 0 A logical deduction from this language would be that the court
felt that although the defendant's warning in this instance was inadequate, if it
had been. strong enough and if the defendant had specifically informed the beautician that this dye was poisonous, the defendant would not have been found
liable. This latter construction would be in conformity with previous decisions
in New York holding defendant manufacturer liable only if he had failed to
give adequate warning to the immediate vendee.

3 HARPER, ToR.TS 243 (1933); 2 ToRTS RESTATEMENT, § 388, comment a
(1934); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 2x7 N. Y. 382, III N. E. 1050 (1916).
"Blood Balm Co. v. Cooper, 83 Ga. 457, ro S. E. us. (1889); Thomas v.
Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397 (1852).
11 HARPER, ToR.TS 243 (1933).
5 Principal case, 256 App. Div. at 1097.

